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Abstract: 
The RSA is based on a trapdoor one-way 
function which is easy to compute but is most hard to 
revert without knowing the trapdoor. A cryptanalysis, 
presented in this paper, consists in finding a new 
decrypt key which plays the same role of the original 
trapdoor. To find this new decrypt key we must seek the 
maximum degree of ciphering function composition in a 
given modulus N. The maximum degree (d_max) is 
obtained by applying the ciphering function to a 
restricted set of residues in the modulus N. We then 
define the new decrypt key by (e^d_max). Thanks to this 
new key, we can decrypt any cipher text for a given 
modulus. The interest of this cryptanalysis, contrary to 
factorization, is that the search of the decrypt key is 
independent from the modulus size.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During many years, cryptology was a science 
exclusively reserved for military and diplomatic fields. 
It used all kinds of coding and cryptographic means, to 
communicate between agents and governments with not 
enemies being able to understand exchanged 
information; this is why the literature on this subject 
was far from abundant.  
Nowadays there is more and more information 
circulating in Internet which needs to remain secret or 
confidential like the payment in e-commerce, the 
banking transactions, the industrial and commercial 
secrecies, the medical secrets, the protection of 
computing systems, the e-mail as well as the privacy 
protection, etc. Thus, cryptology becomes a great need 
for protecting information; this one is based on two 
complementary disciplines: cryptography and 
cryptanalysis, development in one is usually followed 
by further development in the other. 
Cryptography studies methods which allow 
transmitting data in a confidential way. The protection 
of message is made by applying a transformation that 
makes it incomprehensible; this operation is called 
ciphering which gives a cipher text from a plaintext. 
The opposite operation is called deciphering which 
permits to rebuild the plaintext starting from a cipher 
text.  
 
 
Whereas cryptanalysis tries, in particular, to break a 
cryptography algorithm by holding various techniques 
called attacks which aim to detect the possible 
weaknesses of the algorithm. These weaknesses 
represent the vulnerability by which a cryptanalyst can 
decrypt the secrecies of the document without knowing 
deciphering key. Thus, cryptanalysis is an important 
tool for vulnerability assessment of cryptosystems. 
Among the cryptosystems which proved 
robustness against the attacks of cryptanalysts we find 
the RSA. This one being the first asymmetrical 
cryptosystem with public-key but there remains more 
used nowadays to ensure the confidentiality and the 
authenticity of the transactions through Internet. Since 
its invention, the RSA was subject to several attacks to 
highlight certain vulnerabilities but none allowed a total 
break. A panorama of these attacks is reported in 
references [4], [6].   
In this paper we present a new attempt to break 
the RSA. This attempt fully exploits the property of the 
ciphering function composition, which defines a cyclic 
function, in other words: f o f o f o...o f(x) = x. Given 
that the ciphering function is a trapdoor one-way 
function; it is difficult to revert without knowing the 
trapdoor (the private key of the recipient). The objective 
of our attack is to find a new decrypting key, with a 
reasonable search time, which will be able to play the 
same role of the original trapdoor ‘the private key d’.  
To find this new decrypting key, we must seek 
the maximum degree of the ciphering function 
composition in a modulus N. This maximum degree 
represents the iteration count of the ciphering function f 
on a plaintext M until the plaintext appears again.While 
knowing that the degree of the ciphering function 
composition varies from a message to another; it is 
necessary to apply the ciphering function f to restricted 
residues in the considered modulus in order to 
determine the maximum degree (d_max). Thus, the new 
trapdoor is defined by (e^d_max). 
Once the new decrypting key is obtained 
instead of reiterating on the ciphering function f to find 
the plaintext, we anticipate its obtaining by the 
application of this new decrypting key. Thanks to this 
new key we can decrypt any cipher text in a modulus N. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 recalls the basic principle functioning 
of RSA and presents in brief way some attacks 
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 undergone by this cryptosystem. Section 3 described the 
proposed cryptanalysis with a formalization of the idea 
which will be clarified through an illustrative example. 
Conclusions and directions for future works are 
presented in Section 4 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
In this section we recall the basic principle 
functioning of RSA and then we present the principal 
attacks, which are applied to ciphering, undergone by 
RSA during the long years of its existence. 
 
2.1. FUNCTIONING OF RSA 
The RSA, named after its inventors Ron 
Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adelman in 1977 [10], 
is the most widely known and widely used public-key 
cryptosystem in the world today. It is used to secure 
communication in Internet, ensure confidentiality and 
authenticity of e-mail, and it has become fundamental to 
e-commerce. In fact, RSA is usually present wherever 
security of digital data is a concern. 
We can specify the original version of RSA, 
often called textbook RSA, as follows: Let N = pq be 
the product of two large primes p and q, let ZN (the 
integers modulo N). We choose an integer e<φ(N) such 
that gcd(e, φ(N))=1; where φ(N)=(p−1)(q−1) is Euler’s 
totient function. We then calculate d such that e* d = 1 
mod φ(N), i.e. that (e*d-1) is divisible by φ(N). The pair 
of integers (e, N) is the public-key. The pair (d, N) is the 
private-key. We will call e and d the public and private 
exponents, respectively. The integer N is the modulus. It 
is also convention to call the bit length of the modulus 
N the size of the RSA key.  
The ciphering operation in the RSA 
cryptosystem is exponentiation to the eth power modulo 
N:                     C = CIPHER (M) = Me mod N. Where 
the input M is the plaintext and the output C is the 
resulting ciphertext. In practice, the plaintext M is 
typically some kind of appropriately formatted key to be 
shared. The actual message is ciphered with the shared 
key using a traditional ciphering algorithm. This 
construction permits to cipher a message of any length 
with only one exponentiation. 
When the deciphering operation in the RSA 
cryptosystem is exponentiation to the dth power modulo 
N:  M = DECIPHER (C) = Cd mod N.  It finds really the 
plaintext M, because according to the theorems of 
Fermat and Euler: Cd = Me.d = M1+k.φ(N) = M  mod N. 
The relationship between the public e and 
private d exponents ensures that ciphering and 
deciphering are inverses, so that the deciphering 
operation recovers the original message M. Without the 
private key (N, d) (or equivalently the prime factors p 
and q), it is difficult to recover M from C. 
Consequently, N and e can be made public without 
compromising security, which is the basic requirement 
for a public-key cryptosystem. It is also believed that, in 
order to attack this cryptosystem, one must find d, 
which in turn requires φ(N), which is equivalent to 
finding the factors p and q of N. 
The fact that the ciphering and deciphering 
operations are inverses and operate on the same set of 
inputs also means that the operations can be employed 
in reverse order to obtain a digital signature scheme 
following Diffie and Hellman’s model. A message can 
be digitally signed by applying the deciphering 
operation to it, i.e., by exponentiating it to the dth 
power: S = SIGN (M) = Md mod N.  
The digital signature can then be verified by 
applying the ciphering operation to it and comparing the 
result with and/or recovering the message:                    
M = VERIFY (S) = Se mod N. 
In practice, the plaintext M is generally some 
function of the message, for instance a formatted one-
way function of the message. This permits to sign a 
message of any length with only one exponentiation. 
This description of RSA represents the original 
version [10], this one does not satisfy strong concepts of 
safety, in practice, to reinforce the safety of RSA; we 
add random numbers to the process of ciphering and 
during signatures. 
 
2.2. ATTACK UNDERGONE BY RSA 
Since its invention, RSA was the subject of 
many attacks, but none allowed a total break. A 
panorama of these attacks was described in [4], [6]. 
Below we give a brief description of the main methods 
used to attack the RSA cryptosystem. These attacks 
especially showed the danger of an incorrect use of 
RSA:  
1. Factorization: The first possible attack on RSA 
consists in factorizing the modulus N to find p and 
q, to be able to deduce the private exponent d [5]. 
The problem of finding non-trivial factors of a 
given positive composite integer N is known as the 
integer factorization problem. The integer 
factorization problem is widely believed to be a 
hard problem, i.e., there seems to be no 
polynomial time algorithm that solves the problem 
for a large proportion of possible inputs. We 
precise that the faster factoring algorithm known 
to date is the General Number Field Sieve (GNFS) 
[9], whose complexity for n bits is: exp (O (1) (log 
n) 1/3(log log n) 2/3). 
2. Exhaustive Search [4]: Since the ciphering 
function of RSA, C = Me mod N, is a deterministic 
function where the message M having always the 
same cipher text C. For a given cipher text C there 
exists a plaintext M, thus we can confirm if C is 
the cipher text of M. The exhaustive search 
principle is based on the fact that the set of the 
possible messages is known and that its size is 
small. In this case, we can decrypt by exhaustive 
search, by testing all the possible messages. To 
avoid decrypting by exhaustive search, it essential 
to randomize the messages before ciphering. We 
can reach good notions of ciphering when we 
make the ciphering function probabilistic.  
3. Low Private Exponent Attack: The deciphering 
is an operation which requires a very intensive 
compute; it takes linear time proportional to the 
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 size of the private exponent d. Thus some low-
power computers, in order to improve 
performance, use a small d. However M. Wiener 
shows that the choice of a small d can lead to a 
total break of the cryptosystem. More specifically, 
he showed that if  d < 1/3(N)¼ where N is the 
modulus and d is the private exponent an attacker 
can efficiently recover d. (Boneh and Durfee have 
improved the bound to d < N0.292) [3]. In practical 
terms, this means that for a typical 1024-bit RSA 
modulus, the private exponent d should be at least 
300 bits in length. If the public exponent e is 
chosen to be 65,537 (the most commonly used 
value), and we calculate d as d*e =1 mod N, 
then we are guaranteed to have d nearly as long as 
N, and this attack should not pose a threat 
4. The Homomorphic Property of RSA:  The 
cryptosystem has the multiplicative property that 
the ciphering of the product of two plaintext 
messages is the same as the product of the cipher 
texts of the two plaintext messages, when reduced 
modulo N. According to the basic properties of 
modular multiplication, this property is often 
named the homomorphic property of RSA. The 
attack of Boneh, Joux and Nguyen [2] uses the 
fact that, in practice, RSA is mostly used to cipher 
short messages (generally a session key for a 
symmetric key cryptosystem). Essentially, their 
attack is a meet-in-the-middle attack that assumes 
that the desired x-bit plaintext m can be factored 
into two x/2-bit factors m1 and m2 (i.e., m = m1m2). 
The attack begins by constructing a table 
containing each x/2-bit number  and its 
encryption ( )e mod N. Then, for each possible 
x/2-bit number , the value c*( )−e mod N is 
checked against each encryption in the table. 
When  = m2, it follows that c*(m2)−e mod N = 
(m1m2)e(m2)−e mod N = (m1)e mod N, will be in the 
table. When this match is found, the factorization 
of the plaintext m, and hence m itself, is revealed. 
This attack is easily avoided by imposing some 
structure on the plaintexts. In particular, using a 
proper padding scheme, such OAEP [1], is 
sufficient. 
5. Timing Attack: Timing attacks against RSA were 
introduced by P. Kocher in 1995 (see [8]). Timing 
attacks take advantage of the correlation between 
the private key and the runtime of the 
cryptographic operation. Recall that the RSA 
private operation consists of a modular 
exponentiation, using the private key d as 
exponent. Modular exponentiations are usually 
implemented using an algorithm called repeated 
squaring algorithm. If the private key is k bits 
long, this consists of a loop running through the 
bits of d, with at most 2k modular multiplications. 
In each step the data is squared, with the execution 
of a modular multiplication if the current bit of the 
exponent is 1. By measuring the runtime of the 
private operation on a large number of random 
messages, an attacker can recover bits of d one at a 
time, beginning with the least significant bit. Note 
that in view of the partial key information attack 
described earlier, if a low public exponent is used, 
the attacker needs only to find the first k/4 bits 
using this method; the remaining bits can be found 
using the previous method. 
 
3. PROPOSED ATTACK 
Asymmetrical ciphering transforms a message, 
called plaintext, in a cipher text which will be readable 
only by its legitimate recipient. The essential concept on 
which is based public-key ciphering is the trapdoor one-
way function. It is called one-way, if it is easy to 
compute but impossible to revert. Impossible means 
here unfeasible in a realistic time with a reasonable 
computing power.  Such a function is called with 
trapdoor if the computing of the reverse becomes easy 
as soon as we have the trapdoor which corresponds to 
the private key of the recipient. One can consider the 
ciphering with e as the one-way function, with d being 
the trapdoor information. 
The general idea of asymmetrical ciphering is 
to find two functions f and g on the integers, with  g o 
f(x)= x, such as we cannot find the deciphering function 
g starting from the ciphering function f. We can then 
make public the function f (the public-key) which will 
permit to the others to cipher the message to be sent, 
while being the only one to know g (the private key) 
therefore being able to decipher the ciphered message.  
The proposed cryptanalysis consists in finding 
a new trapdoor in a realistic time. This new trapdoor 
permits to reverse the ciphering function as if we have 
the original trapdoor i.e. the private key d of the 
recipient. Our attack exploits the property of the 
ciphering function composition f, which defines a cyclic 
function, in other words: f o f o f o...o f(x) = x. Thus we 
define the decrypting function by: fd : ZN* → ZN*. Such 
as the composition fd o f(x) = x, where f represents the 
RSA ciphering function and fd is the decrypting function 
which will play the same role of the RSA deciphering 
function g, with fd = f o f o f o...= fn-1, where n represents 
the maximum degree of ciphering function composition 
which permits to find the plaintext. In other words, this 
degree represents the iteration count of the ciphering 
function f on a plaintext M to find a plaintext M a 
second time. Knowing each message in modulus N can 
have a different degree of composition, we can 
therefore classify the messages according to their 
degree of composition in different classes. Thus, we call 
a class n, the class which contains all the messages 
having a degree of composition n. This degree of 
composition n not only will permit to decrypt the cipher 
texts in this class, but also all cipher texts of the classes 
lower than n. However, if we find the maximum class, 
this class will include all the possible classes in the 
modulus N and its degree of composition will permit to 
decrypt all cipher texts of this modulus. To find the 
decrypting key which will play the same role of the 
trapdoor, we must seek the maximum class in a 
modulus N by applying the ciphering function f to 
restricted residues of the modulus.  
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 The analysis of the modulus residues showed 
that the maximum degree of composition d_max exists 
always between two messages in the class 1 not 
consecutive. In other words this degree varies in a 
cyclic way between a minimal value and a maximum 
value [7], thus, when the composition degree takes 
again its minimal value that says that all the existing 
classes in a modulus were found.  In general this search 
is more expensive in terms of time, so in order to reduce 
this search time and to improve the performance and the 
effectiveness of our cryptanalysis, several experiments 
and statistics were made. We noted that d_max is 
always found in the first residues and more precisely in 
the first twenty residues of a modulus. To validate this 
assumption several tests were made (exceeding the 
1000 modulus). We can affirm that the maximum 
degree of composition is always present in the first 
twenty residues belonging to ZN*. Once the maximum 
degree of composition (d_max) having been obtained 
this allows deducing the new decrypting key. This 
decrypting key is defined by the public exponent e 
raised with the power of this maximum degree (e^d_max). 
This new key is used to decrypt any ciphertext in the 
module N. 
 
3.1. FORMALIZATION OF THE ATTACK 
In this section we will, in one hand, show that 
the iterations on the ciphering function f can be 
expressed by the public exponent e raised with the 
power m, where m represents the degree of the 
ciphering function composition for a given message. 
In the other hand, since each message can have 
a different degree of composition, we will seek the 
maximum degree without the search time not being 
harmful. 
 
Iteration of the Ciphering Function:  
We must initially show that the iterations on 
the ciphering function f can be expressed by the public 
exponent e raised with the power m, where m represents 
the degree of the ciphering function composition for a 
given message.  In this case, the following integers are: 
N: the modulus of RSA.  
e: the public exponent.   
d: the private exponent.   
M: the plaintext such as M є ZN*. 
C: the cipher text such as C є ZN*. 
The ciphering function f composition is formally 
described by: 
 (1) 
We can express Me mod N by R = Me-QN where: 
Q: the quotient of the division of Me per N. 
R: the remainder of this division.  
By replacing the R by its value in (1) we obtain: 
 (2) 
According to the Newton binomial theorem: 
 (3) 
By applying modulo N to the result (3) we found: 
 
(4) 
Since ∑ei=1 (-1) i Cie (Me) e-i (QN) i mod N = 0, divisible 
per N, we obtain,  
  (5) 
While replacing (5) in the relation (2), we find: 
 (6) 
Search of Maximum Degree: 
The search of the maximum degree of 
ciphering function composition requires finding all the 
existing classes in the modulus N. This search is made 
by the application of the ciphering function to the whole 
of the residues of the modulus according to the 
following relation: 
    (7) 
To optimize the search time and to prevent that 
search was exhaustive; the ciphering function is applied 
to a restricted set of residues in the modulus. Knowing 
that each residue can have a different degree of 
composition and this degree varies in a cyclic manner 
between a minimal value and a maximum value. Search 
will be stopped when the degree of composition is again 
equal to minimal value or the twentieth residue was 
reached, i.e. all existing classes in a modulus were 
found according to the following relation: 
 
   (8) 
The maximum degree of the ciphering function 
composition can then be deduced from the following 
relation: 
 (9) 
The transmitter ciphers the message M by C = Me mod 
N and sends the result to the legitimate recipient. The 
intruder intercepts cipher text C and calculates Ce^ d_max 
mod N to find the plaintext M. In other word: 
 (10) 
Decrypting Algorithm: 
The algorithm presents the way of finding a 
plaintext starting from a cipher text. While having the 
public-key (e, N) and the cipher text C as input, the 
decrypting procedure provides the plaintext as result. 
The function ‘search_degree_max’ permits to find all 
the classes existing in the module N. This function is 
called once to determine the maximum class in a given 
modulus.  The new decrypting key is defined by 
(e^d_max).   
 
procedure decrypting (e,N,C: integer; var 
M: integer); 
  {e, N, C : data   M: result}; 
  var    d_max: integer; 
  function search_degree_max (e,N 
:integer):integer; 
    var   m, max, i : integer; 
    begin 
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       m := 0; 
      max := 0; 
      i := 2; 
      while (m <> 1)or (i = 20) do 
      begin 
        m := 1; 
        while im mod N <> i do 
          m := m + 1; 
        if m > max then 
          max := m; 
        i := i + 1 
      end; 
      search_degree_max:= max 
    end; 
  begin 
    d_max := search_degree_max(e,N)-1; 
    M := Ce^d_max mod N 
  end; 
3.2. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
For better illustrating the principle on which is 
based the theory of our attack, we use an example 
explaining this attack. 
Let us take two prime numbers selected randomly 
p=17 and q=11, therefore the modulus is N=p*q=187, 
and the Euler’s totient function is φ (N) = (p-1) * (q-1) 
=160.  
The public exponent e =23 such as gcd (e, φ (N)) =1, 
and d =7 the private exponent such as e*d = 23*7 = 161 
≡ 1 [φ (N)]. The message M = 123, which is a residue of 
Z*N. 
We notice that by applying the ciphering function f 
several times on to the message M, we found the 
message M a second time: 
((((M = 123)23 mod 187 = 30)23 mod 187 = 72)23 mod 
187 =183)23mod 187 = 123 = M. 
In other words, the ciphering function composition   
f o f o f o f(M) = fd o f(M) = M = 123. This shows that 
we can decrypt the cipher text only by using the 
ciphering function. The degree of the ciphering function 
f composition in this case is m = 4. This one represents 
the maximum degree of composition in this modulus (N 
= 187). 
The application of the ciphering function f to the 
residues of the modulus 187 gives three classes of 
different degrees: 
1. The class of degree 1 contains the messages: 1, 33, 
34, 67, 153, 154, and 186. 
2. The class of degree 2 contains the messages 
belonging to the following intervals: [10..12], 
[21..23], 32, [43..45], [54..56], [65..66], [76..78], 
[87..89], [98..100], [109..111], [120..122], 
[131..133], [142..144], 155, [164..166], [175..177]. 
3. The class of degree 4 contains the messages 
belonging to the following intervals: [2..9], 
[13..20], [24..31], [35..42], [46..53], [57..64], 
[68..75], [79..86], [90..97], [101..108], [112..119], 
[123..130], [134..141],  [145..152], [156..163], 
[167..174],  [178..185]. 
 
For determining the maximum degree d_max, 
it is enough to find all existing classes in the modulus 
N. In this example the maximum class has degree 4, by 
applying the relations (7) and (8) we can deduce that: 
d_max = max (m) - 1 = 3. 
When the intruder receives the cipher text (C 
=12323 mod 187 =30) of the plaintext M = 123. This one 
having already determined the decrypt key, it is enough 
for him to calculate 30 23 ^ 3 mod 187 = = 123, to find 
the plaintext M. 
Through this example, we can deduce that the 
maximum degree will be obtained by consulting only 
the first thirty two residues 2..33 of modulus 187 (since 
messages 1 and 33 belong to class 1 i.e. having a 
minimal degree, instead of an exhaustive research 
which must consult all the residues of the module 
N=187. 
In addition it is important to remark that, 
contrary to the factorization whose complexity grows 
with the growth of the modulus size, the maximum 
degree of composition search time is independent of the 
modulus size, for example, in the module N = 29353, (p 
= 197, q = 149), one consults only the first thirteen 
residues 2..14 of modulus 29353 to find the class having 
maximum degree. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we presented a new attack to 
break the RSA; this attack avoids the principle of the 
factorization which is hard problem to solve in the 
presence of a large numbers. Our attack exploits the 
property of the ciphering function composition which 
defines a cyclic function to find the plaintext. However, 
to avoid the ciphering function iteration each time we 
want to find the plaintext, we anticipate its obtaining by 
a new decrypting key which plays the same role of 
private key d. To find this new key it is important to 
determine the class having the maximum degree in the 
modulus N. This class includes all the other classes, and 
its maximum degree of composition (d_max) permits to 
deduce the new decrypting key (e^d_max). This new key 
decrypts any cipher text in the modulus N. 
 
We showed that the iterations on the ciphering 
function for a given message can be expressed by the 
public exponent e raised with a power m, where m 
represents the degree of composition. 
 
We also showed through an illustrative 
example that the new decrypting key really permits to 
find the plaintext starting from a cipher text, in only one 
operation as if we have the private key. 
In perspective and with an aim of showing the 
interest of this attack: 
1. Improving the search time of the maximum class 
by more restricting the number of consulted 
residues 
2. Elaborating a comparative study between our 
attack, factorization and exhaustive search. 
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